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Martin Senftleben*
Trade Mark Protection – A Black Hole in the Intellec-
tual Property Galaxy?
A black hole is a region of space from which nothing, not even light, can
escape . . . . It is called ‘‘black’’ because it absorbs all the light that hits the
horizon, reflecting nothing, just like a perfect black body in thermodynamics.1
Following traditional trademark theory, trademarks could hardly ever gather
sufficient mass to constitute a black hole. Trademark law offers enterprises
the opportunity to establish an exclusive link with a distinctive sign. Accord-
ingly, the protected sign can serve as a source identifier in trade. This basic
function guarantees market transparency. It ensures fair competition, pro-
tects consumers against confusion and contributes to the proper functioning
of market economies by allowing consumers to clearly express their prefer-
ence for a particular product or service.
To enable trademarks to fulfil this basic function, the gravity field of trade-
mark protection need not be strong. Rather, defensive protection is suffi-
cient. As long as the trademark owner is capable of preventing other traders
from using identical or similar signs for identical or similar goods or services,
the basic identification function of trademarks can be safeguarded. This
protection is to be granted only if use of a conflicting sign is likely to cause
confusion. In cases of double identity (an identical sign used for an identical
product), the risk of confusion may be deemed so obvious that it can be
presumed. Given these clear conceptual contours of traditional trademark
protection against confusion, it is not surprising that agreement on this
limited scope of protection could be reached in the European Union. By
virtue of Art. 5(1) of the Trade Mark Directive (TMD), the grant of this
basic protection is mandatory in all EU Member States. It gives trademark
owners limited control over communication concerning their marks – con-
trol that only covers the identification and distinction of products.
However, modern marketing techniques show that this limited field of grav-
ity can be used strategically to create much more massive trademarks. The
trademark conveys information about the commercial origin of goods or
services. Through investment in advertising, however, an enterprise can
easily add further messages. In particular, an enterprise can use advertising
campaigns to teach consumers to associate a certain attitude or lifestyle with
the trademark. As a result, the trademark begins to ‘‘speak’’ to consumers.
They no longer simply buy products from a particular source. They also buy
the respective ‘‘trademark experience’’ and ‘‘brand image’’.
* Ph.D.; Professor of Intellectual Property, VU University Amsterdam; Senior Consultant,
Bird & Bird, The Hague.
1 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_hole, last visited on April 2, 2011.
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Inevitably, trademark law protects the investment made in the creation of a
favourable trademark image to some extent. Basic protection against confu-
sion safeguards the exclusive link between an enterprise and its trademark.
In this way, it offers the legal security necessary for investment in the trade-
mark. The question, then, is whether the creation of a brand image should
be rewarded with enhanced protection even though this is a selfish endea-
vour. Unlike inventors and authors, the brand owner cannot validly claim to
have created intellectual property that furthers science or art. The trademark
does not fall into the public domain after a limited period of time. Not
surprisingly, EU trademark law is cautious. Enhanced protection against
dilution is optional under Art. 5(2) TMD and counterbalanced by a flexible
defence of ‘‘due cause’’.
This cautious approach is justified. The broader the scope of trademark
protection, the stronger becomes a trademark’s field of gravity. With protec-
tion that no longer requires a showing of confusion, and that is no longer
confined to identical or similar market segments, trademark owners acquire
remarkably enhanced control over the use of the protected sign. The trade-
mark monopoly impacts more deeply on comparative advertising, referential
use and parody. It strongly affects the fundamental guarantee of (commer-
cial) freedom of speech.2
Ultimately, the trademark may even be transformed into a black hole that
absorbs all the communication surrounding it. Step by step, the EU Court of
Justice has paved the way for this supermassive trademark protection by
continuously relaxing protection requirements. The prerequisites of use in
the course of trade and use in relation to goods or services do not constitute
substantial hurdles in the EU.3 The threshold for assuming that a trademark
has a reputation is ridiculously low.4 In line with Adidas/Fitnessworld,
enhanced protection against dilution becomes available the moment a com-
peting sign calls to mind a mark with a reputation.5 After this erosion of
safeguards against overbroad brand image protection, the decision in Intel/
CPM gave hope that the Court might defend at least the remaining bastion –
the infringement criteria of bringing detriment to, or taking unfair advantage
of, distinctive character or repute. Requiring evidence of a change in the
economic behaviour of the average consumer, the Court seemed determined
2 For a detailed analysis of the impact of trademark protection on freedom of expression, see
W. Sakulin, ‘‘Trademark Protection and Freedom of Expression – An Inquiry into the Con-
flict between Trademark Rights and Freedom of Expression under European Law’’ (Kluwer
Law International, The Hague/London/New York 2010).
3 See CJEU, judgment of June 12, 2008, case C-533/06 – O2/Hutchison, paras. 35–36.
4 See CJEU, judgment of 14 September 1999, case C-375/97 – General Motors/Yplon
(‘‘Chevy’’), paras. 24–28. Cf. M.R. F. Senftleben, ‘‘The Trademark Tower of Babel – Dilu-
tion Concepts in International, US and EC Law’’, 40 IIC 45, 50–55 (2009), available online
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1723903.
5 See CJEU, judgment of October 23, 2003, case C-408/01 – Adidas/Fitnessworld, para. 29.
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to set a high threshold for anti-dilution protection.6 However, this hope was
shattered in L’Oréal/Bellure.
Black holes are expected to form when heavy stars collapse in a supernova at
the end of their life cycle.7 L’Oréal/Bellure is the supernova in EU trademark
law. The Court lowered the threshold under Art. 5(2) TMD substantially by
stating that – in the absence of damage – a mere attempt to ride on the
coattails of a mark with a reputation can be sufficient to assume that unfair
advantage has been taken.8 The bastion of infringement criteria, therefore,
was abandoned. The Court, however, did not content itself with this surren-
der. In addition, it held that besides the essential origin function, a trade-
mark’s quality, communication, investment and advertising functions en-
joyed absolute protection under Art. 5(1)(a) TMD.9 With this holding, the
Court clearly trespassed the boundary lines drawn in the Directive. Commu-
nication, investment and advertising are typical functions of marks with a
reputation. The protection of these functions is optional under Art. 5(2)
TMD. By including these functions in the mandatory Art. 5(1)(a) TMD, the
Court eroded the freedom left to EU Member States.
Absolute protection under Art. 5(1)(a) TMD completes the formation of a
black hole. While Art. 5(2) provides for the flexible defence of ‘‘due cause’’,
comparable balancing tools are sought in vain in Art. 5(1)(a). In this region,
the trademark’s field of gravity absorbs all communication, including com-
parative advertising and parody.10 Advertisers can only escape from this
black hole because the Court employs the external balancing tool of rules on
permissible comparative advertising from the neighbouring galaxy of EU
unfair competition law. The trademark owner cannot invoke Art. 5(1)(a)
against comparative advertising that is permissible under the Misleading and
Comparative Advertisement Directive.11 Whether the Court will make simi-
lar efforts for parodists remains to be seen.
Is there any light in the trademark system after the creation of the black
hole? This light may come from an interstellar phenomenon that increasingly
affects trademark law. The Internet, bringing along the challenge of keyword
advertising, allows the Court to reconsider the balance between trademark
protection and (commercial) freedom of speech. The Advocates General in
keyword advertising cases emphasise the need to strike a proper balance.12
The Court’s first decisions are promising.
6 See CJEU, judgment of November 27, 2008, case C-252/07 – Intel/CPM, para. 77.
7 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_hole, last visited on April 2, 2011.
8 See CJEU, judgment of June 18, 2009, case C-487/07 – L’Oréal/Bellure, para. 49.
9 CJEU, ibid., para. 58.
10 Cf. M.R. F. Senftleben, ‘‘Overprotection and Protection Overlaps in Intellectual Property
Law: The Need for Horizontal Fair Use Defences’’, in: A. Kur (ed.), ‘‘Horizontal Issues in
Intellectual Property Law, Uncovering the Matrix’’, ATRIP Conference 2009, (Edward El-
gar Publishing, Cheltenham 2011), available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1597123.
11 CJEU, ibid., paras. 54 and 65
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In Google France and Google, the Court held that the search engine offering
a keyword advertising service does not use affected trademarks in the sense
of trademark law.13 Given the flexible approach to trademark use in past
cases,14 this ruling comes as a welcome surprise. The use made by adverti-
sers, moreover, does not encroach upon the advertising function newly
protected under Art. 5(1)(a) TMD. The Court arrives at this conclusion by
assuming that the website of the trademark owner will feature prominently
among the natural search results.15 This doubtful assumption16 appears as a
strategic argument to bypass the inappropriate function theory developed in
L’Oréal/Bellure. The fact that the Court does not even address the commu-
nication and investment function confirms this impression. Does the Court
already regret the function theory? In any case, the decision seems to indicate
that the threshold for assuming an adverse effect on the communication,
investment and advertising function is rather high. It may also indicate that
Art. 5(1)(a) only concerns detriment. Benefits derived by the advertiser, such
as enhanced attention resulting from the use of a reputed mark as a keyword,
seem irrelevant in this context. This would at least explain the Court’s
hesitance to address the communication and investment function.
A restrictive approach to Art. 5(1)(a) TMD, however, is not necessarily
sufficient to escape from the black hole. Because of the strong communica-
tion, investment and advertising function of marks with a reputation, judges
may be induced to assume that the advertiser attempted to take unfair
advantage in the sense of Art. 5(2) TMD. Given the flexible ‘‘coattail’’
formula developed in L’Oréal/Bellure, this area of protection is part of the
black hole problem. The forthcoming decision in Interflora/Marks & Spen-
cer will show whether the Court is willing to reduce the supermassive
protection in this area as well.17
Mankind may have no influence on black holes in our Milky Way system.
The gravitational power of trademark protection in the intellectual property
galaxy, however, can be brought back to reasonable proportions. The current
black hole in this region need not last forever. The EU Court of Justice
should put an end to the darkness as soon as possible.
12 See Advocate General Poiares Maduro, opinion of September 22, 2009, cases C-236/08–
238/08 – Google France and Google/Louis Vuitton et al., para. 102; Advocate General N.
Jääskinen, opinion of December 9, 2010, case C-324/09 – L’Oréal/eBay, para. 49.
13 See CJEU, judgment of March 23, 2010, cases C-236/08–238/08 – Google France and
Google/Louis Vuitton et al., para. 57.
14 Cf. A. Kur, ‘‘Confusion Over Use? – Die Benutzung ,als Marke‘ im Lichte der EuGH-
Rechtsprechung’’, 2008 GRUR Int. 1.
15 CJEU, ibid., para. 97.
16 See A. Ohly, ‘‘Keyword Advertising auf dem Weg zurück von Luxemburg nach Paris,
Wien, Karlsruhe und Den Haag’’, 2010 GRUR 776 (782).
17 The opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen of March 24, 2011, case C-323/09 – Inter-
flora/Marks & Spencer, paras. 94–99, gives hope in this regard.
4 IIC IIC_2011_001119_1
Satzspiegelhöhe: 192mm iHöhe der gesamten Fahne: 776mm
IIC_2011_001119_1 IIC 5
Satzspiegelhöhe: 192mm iHöhe der gesamten Fahne: 776mm
